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Recent literature on trade has emphasized the role of
ﬁrms’ heterogeneities in export performance and trade spe-
cialization of countries (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Otta-
viano, 2005).
Exporting seems to be a strategy available only to most
eﬃcient and productive ﬁrms even in a framework with
transport costs and no reciprocal dumping.
We do not know much about the internal organization
of these smarter companies which are exporting part of
their production. However, from related theoretical (Help-
man, 2006) and empirical (Rossini and Ricciardi, 2005)
literature we know that more eﬃcient ﬁrms tend to be
more vertically integrated than the average population on
both a domestic and a crossborder basis.
The main purpose of this paper is to link the two streams
of literature on ﬁrms heterogeneities and export, on one
side, and vertical integration and export, on the other side.
Then, we try to answer the question: is the exporting
activity going to aﬀect the degree of vertical integration
making exporting ﬁrms more vertically integrated than
non exporting ﬁrms? And, if so, why?
We investigate these matters at a theoretical tier and
through a set of econometric tests on ﬁrm level data for 25
EU countries. At the theoretical level we consider a model
with two countries each possessing one or two ﬁrms: one
in case of vertical integration and two in case of verti-
cal disintegration. We compare large and small vertically
disintegrated or integrated ﬁrms in an environment with
transport costs and home bias. Larger ﬁrms tend to be
more vertically integrated and to engage in export activ-
ity. The theoretical conclusions are consistent with the
empirical analysis which says that for larger ﬁrms export-
ing activity tends to boost the degree of vertical integra-
tion.
This provides some link between the two literatures,
the ﬁrst maintaining that only more productive ﬁrms ex-
port and the second stating that more productive ﬁrms
are more vertically integrated. The emphasized link dic-
tates that the more enterprises export the more vertically
integrated they are. Why? It is mostly a matter of size
and R&D commitment which enhances productivity.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F12, L22, L24.
Keywords : Vertical Integration, Trade, Ex-
port Ability.
21 INTRODUCTION
The role of ﬁrms’ heterogeneities in export performance and trade
specialization of countries has become a new leitmotiv in interna-
tional economics (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005). Ex-
isting ﬁrms display diﬀerent degrees of eﬃciency. Least productive
ﬁrms do not exit from markets, as perfect competition suggests, but
simply survive, in an imperfectly competitive environment, mak-
ing lower proﬁts and conﬁning their sales to the domestic market.
Exporting becomes a job for more eﬃcient ﬁrms since it involves
additional costs, like transport costs (TC), that can be born only
by the better equipped enterprises.
Firms are more eﬃcient if they show higher productivity, i.e.
lower unit costs. Then, the question is: Where do diﬀerential per-
formances come from? The answer involves many aspects of produc-
tion. We know that much is due to technology and process innovat-
ing R&D (Armour and Teece,1980; Brocas, 2003; Banerjee and Lin,
2001; Perry, 1989). Nonetheless, quite a crucial role is played by
internal organization mode, which may provide actual eﬃciency ad-
vantages to a company (Mclaren, 1999, 2000). Other factors, such as
location or particular market strategies (Pepall and Norman, 2001)
may represent a further explanation of better performance.
The focus of our investigation is conﬁned to some crucial features
of exporting ﬁrms. Unfortunately we do not know much about the
internal organization of these ﬁrms which are more eﬃcient than the
average and export part of their production. Nonetheless some hints
come from related theoretical (Helpman, 2006) and applied (Rossini
and Ricciardi, 2005) contributions. For instance, we know that more
eﬃcient ﬁrms tend to be more vertically integrated on both a do-
mestic and a cross-border basis (Antras and Helpman, 2004; Gross-
man and Helpman, 2002; Buehler and Schmutzler, 2003). It is to
this aspect of internal organizations of ﬁrms that we devote this
study touching both empirical and theoretical aspects of the simple
question: is exporting activity going to aﬀect the degree of vertical
integration (VI)? Or, in other words, are more vertically integrated
ﬁrms exporting more than vertically disintegrated enterprises? And,
if so, why?
To reply to this question at the theoretical level we consider a
model with two countries each possessing one or two ﬁrms which
may be either vertically integrated (VI) or vertically disintegrated
(VD), large or small in terms of capital commitment, willing to
export or not export.
We consider larger ﬁrms as bearing higher ﬁxed costs and lower
variable costs with increasing returns to scale. Theoretically we shall
see in most (country) symmetric cases a kind of dominance of larger
and more vertically integrated ﬁrms (Spengler, 1950). These enter-
3prises are also more willing to export than VD ﬁrms, which, in many
circumstances, tend to conﬁne themselves to the domestic market.
This result may be thought of as the extension and indirect proof
of the statement that only more productive ﬁrms export. Here we
see the conﬁrmation that more vertically integrated ﬁrms are more
productive and, therefore, export more. Our theoretical results will
be quite comprehensive due to the consideration of many diﬀerent,
and sometimes extreme, scenarios. Our ﬁndings are consistent with
empirical analysis maintaining that for larger ﬁrms exporting activ-
ity tends to boost the degree of VI. This is the main outcome of
our econometric analysis of the relationship between VI and export
orientation of ﬁrms, conducted on a sample of 10229 ﬁrms belonging
to 25 EU countries.
Our study provides a partial link between two literatures, the ﬁrst
aﬃrming that only more productive ﬁrms export and the second
stating that more productive ﬁrms are more vertically integrated.
The investigated liaison says that the more ﬁrms export the more
vertically integrated they are. Why? From our study it seems to be
mostly a matter of size, since larger ﬁrms are more VI.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the main model. In the third section we consider some simulations of
the theoretical model. In the fourth section we report on empirical
tests. Section ﬁve contains the conclusions.
2 THE SET UP
We consider two ﬁrms, belonging to two countries H and F, com-
peting in a Cournot mode selling in both their domestic market and
the rival’s market. Each ﬁrm has four possible strategies: verti-
cally integrate (VI), vertically disintegrate (VD), exporting (X) and
non-exporting (no X). Countries are separated by transport costs
of traditional iceberg type. This means that a portion (1 − t) of the
value of the good exported is lost during the shipment from the
country where it is manufactured to the country where it is bought.
Moreover, each country suﬀers some home bias, i.e. consumers pre-
fer domestically produced articles. Hence, foreign goods enter in
the demand function with a “home bias discount” s ∈ [0,1] leading
to imperfect substitutability between home and foreign produced
goods.
The demand curve in country H is:
pH = a − qH − s t qFF (1)
where: pH is the market price of the ﬁnal good sold in country H;
a is the size of the market; s ∈ [0,1] is the Home Bias indicator: the
larger it is the lower is the Home Bias; t is the TC parameter whereby
4(1 − t) is the share of value of a good used up during shipment to
a foreign country; qFF is the quantity of the good produced by the
foreign rival sent to country H. If the rival based in F decides not
to export, the demand function in H reduces to the ﬁrst two terms
on the right hand side.
The corresponding demand function in country F is
pF = a − qF − s t qHH (2)
and the meaning of symbols is the mirror image of those for
country H demand function.
As far as the production organization is concerned ﬁrms may
adopt either a vertically integrated (VI) arrangement or a vertically
disintegrated (VD) one.
We assume that each ﬁrm faces two cost functions: one for the
production of the good sold domestically and another for the share
of production that is shipped abroad.
For the ﬁrm in country H the production costs for the share of
goods exported are:
CHH = e + (c + z)qHH (3)
where CHH is the total cost of production of exports, made up by
a ﬁxed cost to operate on the foreign market e, which is a capital
commitment of shareholders, a variable cost c of producing the ﬁnal
output and the cost of production of the input z manufactured in the
upstream section of the VI ﬁrm. The cost of production of the input
calls for the usual assumption of perfect vertical complementarity,
whereby one unit of input is needed for each unit of output.
The total cost function for the share of the domestically sold
output is:
CH = f + (c + z)qH (4)
which looks similar to (3) but for the ﬁxed capital commitment cost
f which denotes a diﬀerent investment required to sell at home as
compared to exporting. This reﬂects the fact that for many ﬁrms
the exporting activity requires either dedicated production lines or
commercial networks in the foreign countries or both.
The proﬁt function of the V I ﬁrm of H is:
πH = pH qH + t pF qHH − CH − CHH. (5)
If we consider VD we shall have to consider the two separate ﬁrms
operating either in the upstream (U) or downstream (D) section of
the vertical chain of production. The D ﬁrm observes the demand
function for the ﬁnal good and strategically sets its optimal quantity
(Cournot competition) reaction function. The U ﬁrm knows the
market reaction function of D and utilizes it to choose the optimal
5price for the input it sells to D. Then, the cost function of the
producer of the ﬁnal good operating in the D section of the vertical
chain of production will be:
CHH = e + (c + g)qHH (6)
and
CH = f + (c + g)qH, (7)
where g is the price of the input charged by the upstream (U) inde-
pendent producer of the intermediate good required for the assembly
of the ﬁnal good in D.
Once the U ﬁrm has decided its optimal price the D ﬁrm uses
it to pick from its own market reaction function the corresponding
quantity of the ﬁnal good to sell.
As far as country F is concerned, the costs of production of the
V I ﬁrm are:
CFF = ee + (ccc + zz)qFF (8)
and
CF = ff + (cc + zz)qF. (9)
With VD they become:
CFF = ee + (ccc + gF)qFF (10)
and
CF = ff + (cc + gF)qF. (11)
Variables have mirror image meanings. As it may be seen, ﬁxed
and variable costs are diﬀerent in country F with respect to H to
allow for asymmetries among ﬁrms. Moreover, variable costs diﬀer
between the production of the exports and the production for the
domestic market. This allows us to consider rival ﬁrms not only
with diﬀerent cost structure but also with diﬀerent size.
We assume, following common wisdom and related literature,
that a ﬁrm with larger ﬁxed cost has lower variable costs.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm in F is:
πF = pF qF + t pH qFF − CF − CFF. (12)
As anticipated between (5) and (6), with VD there is strategic
interaction between U and D independent ﬁrms. This stage of the
game is absent with VI since inputs are internally transferred at
their marginal cost. There are at least two ways of modeling ver-
tical strategic interaction between independent ﬁrms: resorting to
a Stackelberg vertical relationship whereby the D ﬁrm plays a sort
of follower role, or adopting a Nash-Rubinstein bargaining solution
6(Nash, 1950; Rubinstein,1982). Which one is best? Unfortunately,
the latter solution has market eﬀects (price of the ﬁnal good) quite
close to VI and to vertical collusion. This makes its use not very
attracting despite its wide diﬀusion in theoretical analysis of VI and
VD (Antras and Helpman, 2004). As seen above, we choose the
Stackelberg solution which has the disadvantage of being asymmet-
ric, yet the advantage of being more close to market relationships.
By adopting the Stackelberg mode the game, in the VD case, be-
comes a 4 stage game. In the ﬁrst stage each ﬁrm decides whether
to go VI or VD, in the second whether to export or not to export.
If the ﬁrm goes VI there is just a further market stage where each
ﬁrm interacts with the foreign rival producer of the ﬁnal good in a
Cournot fashion. If the ﬁrm goes VD there will be vertical Stack-
elberg strategic interaction and, afterwards, the fourth stage with
D market rivalry. The Stackelberg vertical interaction requires the
D ﬁrm to set the quantity according to demand. Then the U ﬁrm
decides its optimal input price to charge to the D ﬁrm on the basis
of the quantity chosen by the D ﬁrm.
The game in reduced normal form appears as in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1
H
VI VI VD VD
X no X no
VI X 1 πF,πH 2 πF,πH 3 πF,πH;πUH 4 πF,πH;πUH
F VI no 5 πF,πH 6 πF,πH 7 πF,πH;πUH 8 πF,πH;πUH
VD X 9 πF,πH;πUF 10 πF,πH;πUF 11 πF,πH;πUF;πUH 12 πF,πH;πUF;πUH
VD no 13 πF,πH;πUF 14 πF,πH;πUF 15 πF,πH;πUF;πUH 16 πF,πH;πUF;πUH
As it can be seen, the number of payoﬀs in the cells is not con-
stant.
In cells 1,2,5,6, there are 2 payoﬀs for each cell since the two
ﬁrms, identiﬁed with their country initials, are VI.
In cells 3,4,7,8,9,10,13,14,there are 3 payoﬀs since one ﬁrm is VI
while the other in VD and therefore we have to consider also the
proﬁts of the U ﬁrm.
In cells 11,12,15,16 we have 4 payoﬀs: two of D ﬁrms and two of
U ﬁrms.
Payoﬀs presented are calculated in terms of proﬁts per unit of
capital invested.
This is a novel way to assess industrial payoﬀs we introduce in
this paper. The rationale is that the choice of strategies on the basis
of simple proﬁts is not reﬂecting the ﬁnancial investors’ attitudes.
7Shareholders aim at the maximum proﬁt per unit of capital. Total
proﬁts is not a meaningful ﬁnancial indicator. Managers who run
the enterprise on behalf of shareholders usually maximize the return
of capital invested. In our case we assume, for the sake of simplicity,
that capital is proxied by ﬁxed sunk costs. Therefore we shall put
in the cells simply the ratios of proﬁts over the ﬁxed costs.
When comparing VI and VD we consider a VI ﬁrm on one side.
On the other front we consider a D and a U ﬁrm. We ﬁrst consider
the choice of strategy as made by the D ﬁrm. However, we also
marginally investigate what happens if the export decision was taken
by U.
On the equilibrium properties of this game we do not dwell since
they are similar to those presented in Rossini (2007) and in Lamber-
tini and Rossini (2006). Instead, we go through a set of simulations
to try to mimic some scenarios that will help in the econometric sec-
tion. We resort to simulations since analytical comparative statics
is not feasible.
3 SIMULATIONS
We simulate the above model in diﬀerent scenarios and we describe
the equilibria of the reduced form of the game represented in Table
1.
3.1 SCENARIO 1
The F ﬁrm faces low ﬁxed costs for production and high ﬁxed costs
for exporting. It has higher variable costs for both the production
of the goods sold at home and for the goods sold abroad. The H
ﬁrm has higher production ﬁxed costs and lower variable costs. For
the export activity it has lower ﬁxed costs. Also the U ﬁrm in F has
higher variable costs, reﬂecting a sort of negative externality due to
the small dimension of the D ﬁrm in F. This is actually a scenario
where one small ﬁrm in F competes with a larger ﬁrm in H.
The calibration of this simulation is: a = 1000;c = 1;t = 0.6;s =
0.5,z = 1;e = 100;f = 400;cc = 10;ccc = 15;ff = 10;ee = 150;zz = 6.
Results are in Table S1.
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H
VI VI VD VD
X no X no
I-x 1861; 688 2718; 294 2765; 197;122796 3478; 73;44290
F I-no 10482,1187 24205,622 18563,383;156169 24205,6185;124501
D-x 3037,173;105700 1153,493;138772 874,324;165657;185775 1182,142;219903;56808
D-no 2620,1194;39312 6051,622;121032 4640,430;78230;243621 6051,155;121032;124500
This is a case in which the H ﬁrm is large while the F ﬁrm is
small; H has larger ﬁxed costs for domestic production, lower for
exports. The larger ﬁrm makes lower proﬁts per unit of capital
invested. In the above Table we see that F has a dominant strategy
(VI, no), while H does not have any dominant strategy and chooses
the best out of the dominant payoﬀs of F, i.e.: (VD, no). Then the
equilibrium of the entire game is (VI, no; VD, no).
We may conﬁne to the VD subgame, for instance, because of a
vertical restraint as in Rossini (2007). In this case the equilibrium
for D ﬁrms is (no, X), which is Nash in dominant strategies.
If we were to allow for the U ﬁrms to set the equilibrium of
the VD subgame, the equilibrium would be (X, X) which is Nash
in dominant strategies. Which equilibrium should we credit? We
assume that strategies are chosen by D ﬁrms since they face the ﬁnal
demand. But this is not entirely consistent with the leader role of
U ﬁrms. After all, it would sound logically bizarre to assume that
U ﬁrms decide whether the D ﬁrm should or not export. In any
case there seems to be a conﬂict between U and D ﬁrms as to the
exporting decision: a question worth to be more deeply investigated.
If we conﬁne to the subgame VI the equilibrium is (no, X), which
is Nash in dominant strategies.
The main conclusion from this ﬁrst simulation is that, despite
lower costs of exports, the large ﬁrm exports only if we conﬁne
to subgame VI and subgame VD. The small ﬁrm F never exports,
neither in the entire game equilibrium nor in subgames equilibria.
This is an important statement since it says that VI ﬁrms (and also
VD) may export only if they are large. However, the small ﬁrm
strategy may trap the large ﬁrm into a non-exporting corner, when
there is no restriction about VD versus VI.
We shall see that the conclusions obtained in the subgames are
conﬁrmed by empirical analysis.
1X means exporting, no means non exporting. The third and
fourth payoﬀs in the cells refer to U proﬁts.
9A further consideration should be given to the incentive U ﬁrms
could provide to D ﬁrms to export.
3.2 SCENARIO 2
The calibration of scenario 2 is: a = 100;c = 2;t = 0.6;s = 0.5,z = 1;e =
400;f = 50;
cc = 6;ccc = 9;ff = 10;ee = 150;zz = 4. Here the F ﬁrm is smaller
but faces lower exporting ﬁxed costs than the larger ﬁrm.
TABLE S2
H
VI VI VD VD
X no X no
VI-x 9; 7 17; 29 16; 2;1281 23; 6;557
F VI-no 79,9 202,46 150,3;1516 202,11;1176
VD-x 3,10;512 9,41;737 6; 3;936;1752 8,11;1375;908
VD-no 19,12;301 50,46;1013 37,4;637,2285 50,11;1013;1176
This scenario is less asymmetric than the previous one. There
is an equilibrium in dominant strategies (VI, no; VI, no). In the
subgame of U ﬁrms there is a dominant strategy (X, X). In the VD
subgame for D ﬁrms the subgame equilibrium is (no , no ). It seems
that in this case the preference for VI is quite clear. Again the U
ﬁrms may provide incentives to the D ﬁrms to export. However,
there does not appear any desire to exporting neither in VD nor in
VI. The beneﬁts from exporting accrue mostly to the U section of
production. It seems that when we increase the costs to exporting
for the large ﬁrm, this drags down the exporting attitude also of the
small ﬁrm.
3.3 SCENARIO 3
The calibration is: a = 1000;c = 1;t = 0.9;s = 0.7,z = 1;e = 100;f =
400;cc = 10;ccc = 15;ff = 10;ee = 150;zz = 6 . Here we decrease




VI VI VD VD
X no X no
I-x 1558; 555 2417; 288 2468; 139;103885 2965; 71;43293
F I-no 10458,822 24205,622 19157,270;159568 24205,155;124501
D-x 393,842;93223 821,505;148430 627; 249;167405;183806 826,141;209657;85230
D-no 2614,996;39222 6051,622;121032 4788,299;78748,223724 6051,155;121032;124501
For the entire game among D ﬁrms the equilibrium in dominant
strategies exists and is (VI, no; VI, X), i.e. the largest ﬁrm goes
VI and exports while the smaller ﬁrm goes VI but does not export.
This again is a result which will be conﬁrmed in the empirical tests.
In the VI subgame the equilibrium is (no, X). The larger ﬁrms
exports. The smaller does not.
If we consider the subgame VD the equilibrium is: (VD, no; VD,
X), i.e. the largest ﬁrm exports while the smaller does not. If we
conﬁne to U ﬁrms, F wants to export (dominant strategy), as it is
for H.
3.4 SCENARIO 4
The calibration is: a = 100;c = 2;t = 0.6;s = 0.5,z = 1;e = 20;f = 30;
cc = 10;ccc = 2;ff = 30;ee = 20;zz = 1.
TABLE S4 (symmetric case)
H
VI VI VD VD
X no X X no X
VI-x 59, 59 84, 35 86, 17;(1063) 108; 8;(408)
F VI-no 35,84 77,77 61,35;(1176) 77,19;(1176)
VD-x 17,86;(1063) 35,61;(1176) 22, 22;(1719;1719) 36,17;(2149;804)
VD-no 8,108;(408) 19,77;(1176) 17,36;(804;2149) 19,19;(1176;1176)
In this symmetric case where the two ﬁrms have same ﬁxed and
variable costs, there is an equilibrium in dominant strategies (VI,
X; VI, X). Also if we consider the two subgames of VI and VD
we ﬁnd that there is an equilibrium in X: the dominant strategy
is Exporting. This result is just reproducing the standard result
11that ﬁrms prefer to export than not to export if TC and home bias
are not to high. In case this does not occur we shall end up with
non exporting dominant strategy for both ﬁrms (a simulation not
reported, yet available upon request).
4 ECONOMETRIC TESTS
We have carried out a series of econometric estimations of the rela-
tionship between the level of VI and the export orientation of ﬁrms
belonging to 25 EU countries.
The indicator adopted to statistically describe VI is the ratio
between value-added and sales (V IXti = V Ati/Yti ∈ [0,1]) at ﬁrm (i =
1...n) level in year t. This is an index of VI which captures most
backward upstream vertical integration, while it is mostly silent on
downstream vertical integration. Nonetheless, it appears as the best
indicator of VI and is widely adopted in empirical analysis. The
level of the dependent variable V IXti will be explained by a set of
independent variables.
The ﬁrst is the degree of export orientation measured by the ratio
between the current value of exports over the value of sales by a ﬁrm
(Xti = EXPti/Yti ∈ [0,1]).
The second is the size of the ﬁrm proxied by the level of employ-
ment. This variable (N) has been normalized to one by using the
ratio of the number of employees of each ﬁrm over the employment
of the largest enterprise.
The third variable is the value of productivity at ﬁrm level mea-
sured by individual value-added (PRti ∈ R+).
The fourth is the value of R&D commitment over the revenue.
R&D activity ﬁgures include all kinds of investment without any
distinction among product innovation, process innovation, export
logistic innovation, R&D in transport technology and so on.
The data source is Osiris, produced by the Bureau Van Dijk2.
Data cover enterprises which are listed in stock exchanges or large
companies which are not listed. The ﬁrms belong to 25 EU member
countries3. This database is the only one providing detailed ﬁgures
on exports at ﬁrm tier.
We concentrate on year 2003 since the larger sample supplies the
richest and more recent picture of the variables we are studying.
The estimation is based on OLS.
2See: http://www.bvdep.com/en/osiris.html
3Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finlandia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
124.1 Group 1: Size aﬃnities
We investigate two speciﬁcations. One comprising size, productiv-
ity and exports as explanatory variables (model 1). A second one
includes also R&D expenditure (model 2).
TABLE4 T1: Large ﬁrms (Number of Employees ≥ 1000)
2003 model 1 model 2
coeﬀ.(s.d.) coeﬀ.(s.d.)
Const. 0.257 *** 0.283
(0.009) (0.022) ***
Xt 0.091 *** -0.015
(0.008) (0.019)






1506 N. observations 336
0.117 R2 0.130 R2
66.32 F(3,1502) 12.32 F(4,331)
From Table T1 we can see the estimates of two diﬀerent speci-
ﬁcations adopted for ﬁrms which are classiﬁed as large (with more
than 1000 employees).
The ﬁrst one uses three explanatory variables: X, PR and N. The
ﬁrst two seem to be statistically signiﬁcant and to determine in a
direct way the degree of vertical integration. This is consistent with
what we found in simulation 3. Export orientation and productivity
seem to boost VI. The size variable is not signiﬁcant. However, we
may notice that the test is performed on large ﬁrms, making for
size to become somewhat irrelevant. Then, a ﬁrst sum up, we may
aﬃrm that there exists an eﬀect of export and productivity on VI
for large ﬁrms.
The second speciﬁcation includes R&D as an explanatory vari-
able, whose coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level. How-
ever, the introduction of R&D crowds out and makes fuzzy the
contribution of the export orientation variable in explaining V IXti.
Probably this is due to the fact that exporting ﬁrms carry out more
R&D than non exporting ﬁrms.
4* denotes statistically signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
13TABLE T2: Small-Medium size ﬁrms (Number of Employees
≤ 1000)
2003 model 1 model 2
coeﬀ.(s.d.) coeﬀ.(s.d.)










1881 N. observations 351
0.002 R2 0.7254 R2
1.400 F(3,1877) 228.51 F(4,346)
From Table T2 it appears that small ﬁrm behavior is quite far
apart from large ﬁrms5. Here the level of VI is mostly explained
by R&D and productivity (model 2). In this class of ﬁrms the
eﬀect of export does not seem to be either relevant or signiﬁcant.
As it can be elicited from the Appendix containing the description
of the data set and from Rossini and Ricciardi (2005), the level
of VI among small ﬁrms is highly volatile. This could make any
interpretation of VI quite awkward for small ﬁrms. Moreover, small
ﬁrms are also less trade oriented and more heterogeneous in terms
of all explanatory variables. That means that the eﬀect of export,
on which we concentrate, cannot be deemed as relevant.
4.2 Group 2: R&D intensive ﬁrms
Here we consider ﬁrms which may deﬁned as R&D intensive since
they carry out more investment in R&D. We establish a threshold
level of 4.1% of the value of sales, since the median of ﬁrms in terms
of R&D investment is 4.1% of revenue (see Appendix).
5In addition to that we have to notice that our database is mostly








Xt -0.108 ** -0.104 **
(0.044) (0.044)




Nt -0.455 ** -0.419 *
(0.215) (0.216)
337 N. observations 337
0.8779 R2 0.8787 R2
797.82 F(3,333) 601.05 F(4,332)
As it appears from Table T3, the eﬀect of export orientation on
VI is always negative. The more ﬁrms export the less integrated they
are. Moreover, the smaller are the ﬁrms the more integrated they
are. That runs counter previous results and may be due to the fact
that R&D makes VI less desirable. In both models, size and export
orientation overturn the results we have theoretically seen. R&D
changes the results of the incentive to go VI for U and D ﬁrms and,
therefore, the role of exports becomes somewhat obscure. The fact
is that we do not theoretical priors linking R&D, export orientation
and VI, even if there are contributions on the relationship between
R&D and VI (Lambertini and Rossini, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2005).
4.3 Group 3: Export intensive ﬁrms
Here we consider ﬁrms which export quite above the average (me-
dian = 26.4% of sales). The threshold to deﬁne export intensive
ﬁrms is value of exports over revenue = 26.4%.
15TABLE T4
2003 model 1 model 2
coeﬀ.(s.d.) coeﬀ.(s.d.)
const. 0.317 *** -0.349 ***
(0.082) (0.064)
Xt 0.204 ** 0.140 **
(0.093) (0.068)






1870 N. observations 547
0.003 R2 0.7064 R2
1.92 F(3,1866) 326.02 F(4,542)
From table T4 above we see (model 2) that a very signiﬁcant
relationship exists once we consider R&D and export orientation




Using an international duopoly model we have gone through the
choices of ﬁrms concerning whether to go VI or VD and whether to
export or not to export to a foreign market. We have considered
symmetric and asymmetric scenarios in terms of ﬁrm dimension.
Larger and vertically integrated ﬁrms export while vertically disin-
tegrated ﬁrms tend to shun exports, mostly when they are smaller.
The theoretical results, associated to calibrated scenarios, are
compared to the empirical tests coming from the investigation of
the relationship between vertical integration and export orientation
on a sample of 10229 ﬁrms belonging to 25 EU countries.
Among large ﬁrms, export orientation and size seem to boost VI,
while, among small ﬁrms this does not occur. In the group of R&D
intensive ﬁrms export orientation does not boost VI; moreover, the
smaller ﬁrms are the higher is VI. The clearest result comes from
the test performed among export intensive ﬁrms: when we conﬁne
to these ﬁrms it appears that export orientation boosts VI in a clear
and signiﬁcant way.
The theoretical and empirical results of the relationship between
export orientation and VI are partially conclusive. The last result
that among export intensive ﬁrms export activity increases VI ac-
cords with theory showing a dominance of VI.
There remains quite an open question as to the behavior of
smaller ﬁrms. It is quite awkward to ﬁnd a clear determinant of
VI among small ﬁrms. The main reason may be due to the high
volatility of the vertical organization among them. Unfortunately
we do not know much on this fascinating and still open question.
Further research should investigate this open question and the
triangular link and the causality between export orientation, R&D
and VI.
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196 Appendix: some descriptive statistics.
Data used for our econometric analysis come from Osiris, a database
set up by the Bureau Van Dijk.
We select Osiris since it provides additional data with respect
to what is required by the IV EEC directive. In particular, Osiris
contains data on exports, which are not required in the proﬁt and
loss accounts which constitute the compulsory information for ﬁrms,
especially if listed in stock exchanges.
The dataset is composed by 10229 ﬁrms located in one of the 25
EU countries. Their geographical distribution is shown in Table A1:
Table A1
Countries Firms (No) Countries Firms (No)
Austria 159 Latvia 69
Belgium 255 Lithuania 41
Cyprus 7 Luxembourg 63
Czech Republic 288 Malta 10
Denmark 273 Netherlands 357
Estonia 19 Poland 89
Finland 197 Portugal 119
France 1324 Slovakia 18
Germany 1187 Slovenia 18
Greece 285 Spain 286
Hungary 40 Sweden 528
Ireland 138 United Kingdom 4074
Italy 385 Total 10229
The sample is composed by large companies, mostly listed in the
stock exchanges, whose size should be measured in terms of sales and
number of employees. Further information on the ﬁrms included in
our dataset is in table A2.
In our regressions, we identiﬁed subsamples composed by large
or small-medium companies, R&D intensive companies, and export
intensive ﬁrms. Table A3 shows the distribution of variables used to
segment our sample and variables used in our regressions. The size
variable is based on the number of employees and is normalized to
one. The number of employees (table A2) has been used to identify
large companies (ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees). Produc-
tivity has been used as an explanatory variable in our regressions.
We use an index often applied in the literature (Del Gatto et al.,
2006) given by the ratio between value-added and number of em-
ployees. The third column of table A2 represents the distribution of
the investment in R&D over the level of sales. This index has been
20used both as an explanatory variable and to identify R&D intensive
ﬁrms, namely companies which invest more than 4.1% of their sales
in R&D (the median). Similarly, the ratio of exports over sales is
one of our key explanatory variables and a tool to identify export
intensive ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms selling abroad more than 26.4% of their
production (the median).
Table A2
Percentile VI Employees Sales Value Added Proﬁts
(obs.) (3413) (3858) (4122) (3793) (3899)
10 0.142 37 6513.7 1271.8 3407
20 0.206 104 19931.4 6162.4 10362
30 0.259 201 41453.1 13284.2 21119
40 0.302 361 77940.2 24708.2 34999
50 0.348 624 134246.0 42558.0 59477
60 0.392 1116 226780.8 71897.0 101372
70 0.453 2056 429279.4 132376.6 182759
80 0.535 4214 939157.6 297323.6 411781
90 0.642 12257 2857464.0 857347.6 1142716
mean 0.372 6949.56 1744182.0 497639 744236.9
Table A3
Percentile Employees (%) Productivity R&D (%) exports/sales
(3858) (3640) (939) (4096)
10 0.000 16.7 0.002 0.000
20 0.000 37.4 0.006 0.000
30 0.000 49.2 0.015 0.000
40 0.001 58.0 0.025 0.086
50 0.001 66.5 0.041 0.264
60 0.003 75.8 0.065 0.453
70 0.005 88.3 0.116 0.674
80 0.010 112.0 0.186 0.872
90 0.030 188.4 0.423 1
mean 0.017 194.5 4.039 0.412
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